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There is a searing and acute suffering involved in the realization that a loved 
one, seriously brain-injured in an automobile accident, has lost forever the 
functional integrity of the upper hemispheres of the brain. As a consequence of 
this profound insult to the brain, the individual is deprived of the capacity for 
speech, conscious interaction, and the vital communication we prize in human 
relationships. All that remains is the functioning brain stem which controls 
heartbeat and respiration. Provided with nutritional and hydration support, the 
patient who is otherwise "biologically tenacious"· will continue to live a 
prolonged and relatively comfortable existence in this condition known as 
"persistent vegetative state" (PVS). This medical condition accurately describes 
the plight of several well known cases that have been in the forefront of a 
vexatious and troubling debate among ethicists and health care professionals. 
Names such as Nancy Cruzan, Paul Brophy, and Nancy Jobes have dominated 
media and public policy discussions. 
In this essay, I propose to examine the debate among Roman Catholic moral 
theologians and to review with some care the crucial distinctions that have been 
operative in these moral appraisals. In addition, several episcopal conferences have 
made significant interventions on this issue including, among others, the bishops of 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington and Oregon.2 I will refer to these statements at 
the end of the paper, but for the initial purposes of my argument I will summarize 
the most recent statement of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
operating through its public policy arm, the United States Catholic Conference. 
This response of the American Catholic hierachy is captured in its long awaited 
paper, Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections. 3 The proponents 
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as well as the opponents of artificially delivered nutntlOn and hydration 
(ADNH) have appealed to the same ethical criteria but with differing emphases 
and with different conclusions. While the majority of American Roman Catholic 
moralists continue to support withdrawal of ADNH, nonetheless, the arguments 
of those who oppose withdrawal of ADNH present critical challenges. Needless 
to say, the debate has created a pubic policy controversy, and the Bishops' 
Statement endeavors to stand in what Richard McCormick calls "the critical 
middle."4 . 
My thesis is that the debate discloses the inevitable collision of divergent 
perspectives concerning the basic methodological presuppositions of Catholic 
moral theory. Briefly stated, these perspectives are a "proportionalst" calculus of 
moral norms and a deontologically influenced natural law assessment of moral 
norms. At the risk of considerable oversimplification by a proportionalist 
calculus, I am referring to a process of weighing or "measuring" competing 
values in a moral decision which factors in moral rules or norms, and is grounded 
in a conviction that the concrete details of a particular case are ultimately 
determinative for assessing the applicability or relevance of the moral rules which 
are invoked. Similarly, by a "deontologically influenced natural law assessment," 
I am referring to a process of moral analysis which stresses a moral order 
discovered by human reason (i.e. "natural law"), and develops moral principles 
that cannot be overridden by appeals to changing circumstances in the particluar 
case, hence the adjective "deontological" which means "duty" or "obligation." 
In my view, the impasse discloses not so much the failure of these different 
approaches to casuistry in addressing ADNH, but rather the need to attend to the 
narrative description of the persistent vegetative state patient which is inscribed in 
the critical distinctions invoked by the moralists. Attending to such notions as 
care, comfort and solidarity with the weak may suggest a more fertile common 
ground for conversation. Leslie Rothernberg has raised the need to move to these 
considerations in his insightful review of the Brophy case.5 
Accordingly, I plan to argue in three steps: first of all, a brief summary of the 
moral positions related to ADNH as outlined in the Statement of the American 
hierarchy; secondly, some critical questions with respect to the interpretation and 
application of moral criteria; and finally, the value of narrative description in 
order to pose some questions and challenges. 
I. April, 1992 Statement ofthe NCCB. 
The Statement begins with an appeal to fundamental Catholic convictions 
regarding life as a gift entrusted to human beings, a gift which entails the 
obligation of proper stewardship. On this rendering, euthanasia, understood as 
any action or omission with the express intention of directly ending the life of a 
human being, is expressly forbidden.6 Moreover, suffering is viewed as a "fact of 
human life" and can be alleviated as necessary to assure the comfort of the 
individual. 
The duty to care for one's life is an application of the principle of stewardship 
and the exercise of this stewardship does not entail recourse to remedies deemed 
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to be "extraordinary" or "disproportionate," that is, remedies which do not offer 
a "reasonable hope of benefit" or are viewed as offering excessive burdens. A 
consultative process is advised in making the determination about the 
withdrawal of treatment with due regard given to the various roles of physicians, 
patients and families. The final stage of the dying process does not require the use 
of every available means to sustain life and such measures can be ethically 
foregone. Death is seen as an integral part of human life and must be accepted 
with equanimity and faith. 
The document sees life as a gift and a gift that must be treated with dignity and 
respect. Any form of discrimination or violation of the rights of every human 
person regardless of aptitUde or disability is seen as a transgression of the principle 
of justice. With these general principles in place, the document moves to the 
specific issue of ADNH. 
There are seven questions posed to frame the response of the instruction. The 
document endeavors to make several clarifying responses in the light of these 
questions. The first question asks whether withholding or withdrawing ADNH is 
always a direct killing. In response, the instruction avoids two extremes. On the 
one hand, an omission can be a form of direct killing because it withholds 
appropriate treatment in order to cause the death of the patient. On the other 
hand, not every omission need be construed as an act of euthanasia since the 
intention of the omission may legitimately be understood as the withholding of a 
remedy which is of "limited usefulness to the patient or unreasonably 
burdensome for the patient and the patient's family or caregivers."7 The 
instruction then notes that under some circumstances withholding ADNH is 
done precisely because the patient is not dying and is perceived as "having as 
unacceptably low 'quality of life' or as imposing burdens on others."8 
The second question touches upon the vexing conversation of whether 
AD NH is a form of treatment or care. The complexities of the patient's condition 
make this distinction difficult and the document reiterates the traditional appeal 
to the criterion of the burden/benefit test in order to guide the decision in the 
form of the following principle.9 
Out of respect for the dignity of the human person, we are obliged to preserve our own 
lives, and help others preserve theirs, by the use of means that have a reasonable hope of 
sustaining life without imposing unreasonable burdens on those we seek to help, that is, 
on the patient and his or her family and community. 
Questions three and four specifically address what is meant by the benefits and 
burdens of medically assisted nutrition and hydration. Among the benefits are the 
sustenance of human life, the provision of necessary care particularly for those 
likely to benefit from a possible cure, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering 
from dehydration, hunger and thirst in imminently dying patients. With respect 
to burdens, the document repeats the criteria offered by several Catholic 
theologians published in the journal, Issues in Law and Medicine, Winter 1987.10 
Specifically, medical treatment is regarded as burdensome when it is "too painful, 
too damaging to the patient's bodily self and functioning, too psychologically 
repugnant to the patient, too restrictive of the patient's liberty and preferred 
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activities, too suppressive of the patient's mental life, or too expensive."ll 
Normally, the patient is the one to make this determination, but assistance from 
health care professionals should be sought. 
The document identifies "physical risks and burdens" which depend upon the 
nature of the treatment itself, and the condition of the patient. Less burdensome 
measures should be sought rather than an outright dismissal of ADNH 
particularly for PVS patients whose care is more easily managed by recourse to 
ADNH. Question four then addresses the assessment of psychological and 
economic burdens. 
Mere "repugnance" is not a sufficient warrant for withdrawing treatment. 
Rather, the patient should be assisted with counseling and other interventions to 
appreciate the gift of life. Secondly, the document emphasizes the importance of 
"reasonable" wishes of the patient and the family underscoring the invaluable 
assistance of medical professionals and family members in reducing the fears 
experienced by the patient. Moreover, solid medical data is available indicating 
that not all patients find the provision of such measures to be inherently 
"repugnant." However, the more substantive discussion in the document is 
devoted to the analysisi of economic burden and the question of "quality oflife" 
criteria. 
The document offers a helpful distinction between an altruistic intention on 
the part of a patient not to impose excessive financial burden on family members 
and directly intending death from removal of ADNH. Sceondly, macro-ethical 
questions about the allocation of resources should not be assumed to have 
reached the level of clarity or specificity to determine decisions at the individual 
level. Thirdly, while the provision of tube feedings is generally inexpensive, the 
ancillary care that is required to sustain patients is quite expensive and 
burdensome. The instruction clearly acknowledges these difficulties and does not 
underestimate them. Nonetheless, the document asks caregivers to think through 
the reasons for withdrawal decisions. Are they performed because of the 
burdensomeness of ADNH or because the patient's continued survival in a 
diminished capacity causes the burden upon others? Rather than relying upon the 
withdrawal of ADNH to assure the desirable outcome of alleviating the "total 
burden of caring for the patient," society should make appropriate provisions for 
the financial, emotional and supportive services needed by those who need 
long-term care. 
Question five asks what role should "quality oflife" play in our decisions? The 
response of the document is a reaffirmation of the intrinsic dignity and equality of 
every human life. The sanctity of human life precludes any prejudicial 
assumption that persons with disabilities are to be treated with less respect or 
protection. If the "quality oflife" consideration is invoked, three observations are 
in order: 
(1) Each patient's quality of life should be improved by measures which 
remove needless suffering. 
(2) Treatment may be foregone if it creates new and serious additional burdens 
upon the patient. Again, the reason for foregoing treatment is not the disability of 
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the patient, but the burden of the additional treatment. 
(3) If the patient is experiencing a disabling incapacity to tolerate the provision 
of ADNH, less invasive measures should be taken to alleviate the burden for the 
patient. 
It is important to note that the document carefully acknowledges a limited role 
for the place of "quality of life" considerations, but underscores that since 
euthanasia is often furthered by appeals to the notion of "quality of life," the 
operative control must be recourse to the "sanctity of life" of each individual. 
Whether or not "quality oflife" can be rescued from its more deadly implications 
is at the heart of a significant conversation in the ethical literature, and I will 
address this matter in the latter section of the paper. 
Question 6 turns to the more specific question of whether PVS patients 
constitute a "special case." The document gives a helpful appraisal of the key 
issues of agreement among theologians on the question. There is consensus that 
the life of the unconscious patient is to be treated with inherent dignity and value. 
Direct killing is forbidden . Moreover, there is a consensus that the debate does 
not concern patients whose condition is other than PVS, i.e., patients with 
Alzheimer's Disease, the severely demented and so on. The critical issue of 
disagreement is with the PVS patient. 
Those who argue for the removal of ADNH for PVS patients proceed by 
establishing that the burden/benefit test applies to the total condition of the 
patient, and that the critical judgment rests upon the appraisal given to the 
physical life ofthe patient. Physical life isjudged not to be the highest good ofthe 
patient, but rather as a valuable good subordinate to the capacity to achieve the 
purposes of life's goals. Therefore, since PVS patients are constitutionally 
incapable of ever realizing the higher, interactive expressions of consciousness, 
there is no obligation to sustain them in this condition, and all life-support 
measures, including ADNH, can be withdrawn. The intention in doing so is not 
to end the life of the patient, but to allow an underlying fatal pathology to take its 
course and to circumvent the excessive burden of life-support maintenance. 
Therefore, no direct killing of the individual occurs, rather, the natural dying 
process is allowed to unfold. 
On the other hand, those who argue against the withdrawal of ADNH for PVS 
patients contend that the assumption that human. physical life is not a positive 
good in and of itself would set into motion a dangerous precedent. Human, 
physical life, in other words, cannot be construed instrumentally, that is, as a 
means to achieve other purposes, including such purposes as "life's higher 
goals."l2 As William May contends, "human life is an intrinsic good of persons; it 
is not merely an instrumental good, a good for persons."l3 The assessment of 
burden, moreover, requires qualification. PVS is a severe neurological disability, 
not a fatal pathology. Because nutritional support can be provided and does 
provide the minimal benefit of maintaining the patient's physical life, ADNH is 
not extraordinary care and should be provided as an acknowledgment of the 
patient's inherent dignity and worth as a person. 
Clearly, there is an impasse between these two positions, and the statement 
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finds that recourse to probabilism is not a satisfactory resolution. This tradition 
has maintained that the presence of reasonable and equally compelling moral 
appraisals affords the individual the freedom of choice to follow the most 
persuasive or "probable" course of action. However, there is a critical caveat, 
namely that in matters dealing with the value of human life, the "safer" course of 
action must be followed. Rather than advocating the route of moral probabilism, 
the statement reaffirms key values including the recognition of excessive burdens 
as well as the intrinsic dignity of human life. The statement strives for a middle 
course, a course which recognizes the complexity of the issue, advocating 
prayerful discernment, and endorsing further research. 
The document expresses concern that an entire class of patients, namely PVS 
patients, be placed at risk because they cannot be restored to optimal cognitive 
functioning. The document relies upon .the Jack of clear scientific criteria for 
the diagnosis of PVS, the lack of·" conclusive evidence that PVS patients 
experience pain, and the fear that PVS patients are likely to be dismissed as 
"non-persons or as undeserving of hu'man care and concern."14 Finally, the 
concern is raised that even well-meaning and careful moral arguments can be 
"misinterpreted, broadened, and abused by others to erode respect for the lives of 
some of society's most helpless members."15 The conclusion of the statement 
deserves full citation:16 
In light of these concerns, it is our considered judgment that while legitimate Catholic 
moral debate continues, decisions about these patients should be guided by a 
presumption in favor of medically assisted nutrition and hydration. A decision to 
discontinue such measures should be made in light of a careful assessment of the burdens 
and benefits of nutrition and hydration for the individual patient and his or her family 
and community. Such measures must not be withdrawn in order to cause detah, but they 
may be withdrawn if they offer no reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive 
risks or burdens. We also believe that social and health care policies should be carefully 
framed so that these patients are not routinely classified as "terminal" or as prime 
candidates for the discontinuance of even minimal means of life support. 
The seventh and final question of the statement moves beyond the narrow 
question of who is the appropriate decision-maker to focus on principles for good 
moral decision-making which will include the interests and competencies of the 
patient, proxy decision-makers, health care professionals, and even the interests 
of society as a whole. 
The foregoing summary of the NCCB statement helps to frame the complexity 
of the issues involved in the care of PVS patients. In the following section of the 
paper, I propose to explore some critical points of methodological conflict in the 
argument. 
II. Critical Tensions in the Moral Argument 
It is helpful to locate the history of the moral argument in Roman Catholic 
moral theology within the larger context of developments related to the 
management of critically ill patients. In a recent essay, Charles Sprung, M.D., 
argues that changing attitudes and practices in foregoing life-sustaining treatment 
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are leading ineluctably to a greater permissiveness with respect to euthanasia in 
this country.17 Sprung's thesis is not a simplistic invocation of the slippery-slope 
and its attendant dangers, but a thoughtful appraisal of the current societal and 
economic factors which influence critical-care decision making. I think Sprung 
accurately analyzes the current state of affairs, but more importantly, I think his 
analysis focuses attention upon the presuppositions that are often overlooked in 
the detailed moral casuistry surrounding critical-care decision-making, and this 
insight is applicable to ADNH. According to Sprung:IS 
If a treatment is deemed futile not because it will fail technically but rather because the 
life saved is deemed not worthy of being saved, a moral judgment and not a medical 
judgment has been made. Judgments concerning the social worth of a patient's life have 
traditionally been considered unacceptable criteria for forgoing care. 
If we follow Sprung's lead by focusing upon the presuppositions which are 
brought both to the appraisal and application of moral norms, I think the 
following "crtical tensions" emerge as the neuralgic core of the ethical impasse: 
(1) Can "quality of life" considerations be sufficiently re-worked to serve as 
reliable criteria for the assessment of benefit and burden? (2) Can the concepts of 
"personhood" and "biological life" be distinguished without collapsing into a 
form of dualism? (3) Does the withholding of ADNH for PVS patients involve us 
in a re-description if not a re-definition of death? If so, what are the public policy 
implications of such a move? (4) What role should autonomy play in the refusal 
of ADNH, and under what conditions? I think these four questions disclose 
enduring tensions in the moral casuistry surrounding the issue, and, after a brief 
analysis of each of these considerations, I offer a concluding reflection on 
narrative description as a way of dislodging the ethical impasse. 
First, several ethical analyses have attempted to use the notion of "quality of 
life" as a mechanism for adjudicating the trade-off of burdens and benefits in the 
continued provision of ADNH for PVS Plltients. Lawrence Holst, for example, 
contends that quality oflife (QL) has emerged as a decisive factor because of the 
capacity of modern medicine to maintain biological life and the "recognition that 
individuals derive essential meanings and personal fulfillments in life from a 
variety of sources, many of which transcend biological existence."19 Holst further 
argues that the QL criterion means "life is not an absolute good, but rather a 
relative good that enabl~s one to pursue other goods."20 Moreover, Holst 
recognizes that QL can be "very relative, subjective, soft and imprecise .. . But 
what is the alternative?"21 
It is worth noting thai the critical issue for Holst, and echoed by other moralists 
including Richard McCormick and Kevin O'Rourke, is the contention that life 
(understood as physical, biological life) is not an absolute but a relative good.22 
The point behind this contention is the desire to avoid a crude vitalism as the 
moral lever governing treatment decisions. However, there is the enduring 
danger that physical, biological life will be undervalued to the detriment of those 
who are developmentally disabled or cognitively compromised. 
Recognizing these pitfalls, Thomas Shannon and James Walter have 
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undertaken a valiant effort to rescue the notion of QL from its more sinister 
implication that some lives-Me deemed "unworthy" of protection and respect. 23 
The authors value the physical life of every individual as worthy of equal 
protection and not as a "conditional" value (bonum utile, or good which is 
viewed instrumentally) depende~t upon some other standard. Nonetheless, this 
physical good or bonum onticum (ontic good or prima facie value independent of 
any ancillary values which it may serve), must be distinguished from personal life 
(personhood).24 Pursuing this line of thought, the authors argue that "quality" is 
not to be understood as an attribute or property of life, but rather should be 
understood as referring to the relationship (authors' emphasis) "which exists 
between the medical condition of the patient, on the one hand, and the patient's 
ability to pursue life's goals and purposes understood as the values that transcend 
physical life on the other."25 QL, then, is understood not "consequentially," that 
is, because patient X possesses or does not possess some desired attribute, but 
"teleologically," that is, not on the basis of some desired quality or attribute, but 
on the "relationship between the patient's overall condition and his/her ability to 
pursue life's goals and purposes."26 
While this careful and thoughtful essay has much merit, I am not sure that it is 
a fully successful enterprise. My difficulty lies with th~ ,:Si,iisjunction between 
physical life and personhood. According to John Grondeleski, such a disjunction 
is tantamount to equating personhood with a desired level of consciousness. This 
perspective has implications for the benefit/burden test:27 
The traditional benefits/burdens test asked whether a particular means was 
burdensome; now, it is not the means but the life itself which is weighed. Life is no longer 
self-justifying; it must meet a certain standard, a certain level of communicative 
consciousness, or that life is declared burdensome. 
Philip Smith, a Thomistic philosopher, reviews the notion of personhood in 
relationship to the PVS patient, and concludes that the functional impairment 
experienced by the PVS patient is not a warrant for concluding that the soul, 
understood as the organizing principle which unifies the many capacities of the 
body into an integrated system, is separated from the body by the onset ofPVS. In 
Smith's view, this contention introduces an "erroneous dichotomy between 
person and body."28 
I am troubled by the implication that the quality oflife of the PVS patient loses 
its protectability when there occurs the "permanent absence of consciousness and 
the ability to engage in human interaction," a verdict reached by sixteen 
theologians at a conference held by the School of Theology at Claremont in 
December, 1989.29 Therefore, my first "critical tension" in the moral debate is 
focused on the issue of quality of life. To the extent that this notion requires a 
disjunction between physical life and the notion of personhood, I do not think 
that it successfully avoids the objection that it undercuts the moral valence ofthe 
notion of personhood to ensure equality and protectability. 
My second critical tension builds upon the first and focuses upon the issue of 
dualism in the disjunction between physical life and personhood. According to 
Philip Smith, after a thorough analysis of the criteria for ascertaining the 
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neocortical status of the PVS patient, PVS patients are not dying patients because 
the intact brainstem maintains vegetative activities including spontaneous 
respiration. This level of impairment does not constitute sufficient damage to 
indicate the soul's departure and thus to cause death.30 Such patients "retain 
enough functional integrity to be compatible with the human soul," and Smith 
wisely points out that though they are not dying this conclusion does not resolve 
the question of whether or not they should receive ADNH. Nonetheless, the 
critical caution that he raises and that I also endorse is that the solution must not 
move in the direction of "defining them out of existence."31 Grondeleski adds that 
dualism appears to be an inescapable feature of the positions adopted by Richard 
McCormick, John Paris, and Edward Bayer.32 
For them the decisive question is the absence of an explicit ability to express interaction 
with other persons. This author cannot see how such an approach differs from a 
Cartesian dualism which reduces the body to a mere subpersonal appendage of the 
"person" (sci!. "consciousness"). Nor can this author see how Cartesian dualism could 
be reconciled with a Catholic anthropology. 
There appears to be the same form of dualism in the rationale provided by the 
Claremont theologians in their statement endorsing withdrawal of ADNH for 
PVS patients. Providing sustenance to these individuals is tantamount to 
"artifically sustaining metabolism."33 In my view, such a perspective effectively 
dehumanizes these damaged persons and removes them from the human family. 
Whether or not withdrawal of ADNH is appropriate, my concern is that the 
reason for such decisions not rest on the faulty presupposition of a dualist 
anthropology which de-values and harms PVS patients and those who are 
similarly, though differently compromised, such as Alzheimer's patients and 
those with severe cognitive and mental impairments. 
My third critical tension is related to the issue of dualism and concerns the 
implications associated with re-descriptions or re-definitions of the meaning of 
death. Daniel Wikler argues for a re-consideration along these lines by suggesting 
that PVS patients are really suffering from amentia, "an absence of everything for 
which people value existence. Its position as the limiting case on the continuum-
the patient for whom all life has ebbed-is what justifies regarding it as death."34 
Wikler's proposal to redefine death to include PVS would perhaps ease the 
anguish of treatment decisions but it is hard to comprehend what criteria would 
prevent the escalation of such an approach to encompass others under its 
umbrella. Wikler's distinction of "psychological" death from "bodily" death 
relies upon a dualistic construal ofthe human person and represents, in my view, 
a most unwise departure from the integral conception of brain death as death of 
the whole brain, including the lower brain stem. Groups who work with persons 
with varying degrees of physical and mental disability are rightly concerned 
about such overtures, and I judge that efforts to re-define brain death criteria to 
address the difficulties associated with PVS patients are unwarranted and 
unjust.35 
Granted the above considerations, my final critical tension deals with the issue 
of autonomy and the ability of the PVS patient or surrogate decision-maker to 
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forgo ADNH. Does the availability of the technology require its use, and can an 
individual refuse ADNH without incurring the moral objections against 
withdrawal? Germain Grisez, in an article retracting an earlier endorsement of 
withdrawal of ADNH, and also written in counterpoint to Kevin O'Rourke's 
article supporting withdrawal of ADNH, nonetheless suggests that such an 
indivdual may refuse to accept ADNH. Grisez contends:36 
Competent persons who envisage the situation of being comatose, and who clearly and 
freely reject food in that situation should it ever come about, need not be choosing to kill 
themselves. They can, instead, be choosing both to avoid being kept alive by a method 
toward which they feel psychological repugnance and to free others of the burden of the 
cost of caring for them. If people who have made and adequately communicated such a 
decision become comatose, others can comply with their choice without in any way 
violating human solidarity with them. Under these conditions, not caring for comatose 
persons is not abandonment. Rather, by respecting the comatose person's wishes, others 
express their benevolence, affirm that person's dignity, and maintain the bond of human 
communion with him or her. 
Grisez is quite clear that such a decision does not extend to those who have not 
made such a determination, and he is concerned that cost-containment pressures 
not dictate the decision. My problem with Grisez's formulation is the issue of how 
and in what sense an appeal to autonomy can "trump" other ethical considerations 
including the moral integrity of the means used to achieve one's desired ends or 
purposes. Even though an appeal to "psychological repugnance" to justify refusal 
of ADNH appears to be ruled out in the NCCB Statement, nonetheless Grisez's 
proposal warrants another look. Perhaps a more effective strategy might be to 
focus on the moral virtue of Magnanimity" or "large-souledness" as a possible 
warrant justifying such a refusal of life-sustaining treatment. In other words, I 
would not want to rule out the possibility of self-sacrifice as an act of moral 
heroism on the part of an individual (or a duly empowered surrogate decision-
maker) as ajustification for refusal to accept ADNH. But, more importantly to my 
mind, Grisez's analysis indicates a need to attend to a critical issue with which I 
conclude my remarks. 
This issue is the need to articulate with more clarity the intellectual and moral 
commitments we bring to the issue of ADNH for PVS patients. After perusing the 
many careful and sensitive articles on this question, I am left with the impression 
that there is a great hunger for the decisive and definitive application of the 
available moral principles that will deliver us from the impasse on the issue. It is 
precisely here where I think our energies are misplaced. Allow me to suggest an 
alternative construction of the question which may yield more dividends in our 
approach. 
III. Towards a Narrative Description of Critical-Care Decision-Making 
Edmund Pincoffs in his insightful and landmark essay, "Quandary Ethics" 
suggests that it is precisely the conception that ethics is chiefly about problems 
and decisions that misleads us in the effort to resolve moral dilemmas.37 The 
insistence upon principles and careful casuistry as conceptual tools to aid us in the 
quest for moral wisdom is certainly appropriate. However, the enduring 
temptation in this pursuit is the tendency to think that life is a series of crises that 
72 Linacre Quarterly 
must be managed successfully. Neglected in such a construction of the moral 
enterprise is the equally salutary admonition that there are dimensions oflife that 
cannot be managed or easily controlled within the confines of neatly defined 
moral categories. Issues such as suffering, death, and the unpredictable contours 
of historical existence elude tidy categorization. Moreover, many aspects of life 
cannot be construed within a "decisionist" or "quandary" framework. It is 
difficult, for example, to conceptualize the obligations that we inherit by being 
members of a biological family unit as choices or decisions amenable to a 
rigorous moral logic. As Stanley Hauerwas has observed in the whimsical title of 
one of his essays, "Must a Patient be a Person to be a Patient, or He isn't much of a 
Person, but He's still My Uncle Charlie."38 Hauerwas's point is that recourse to 
an abstract notion such as "personhood" may not be sufficient to capture the 
distinctive and particular obligations that flow from our concrete human 
relationships. 
The acknowledgment of moral complexity and the more diffuse 
considerations which encapsulize every human life should not be understood as 
an abdication of critical moral reasoning. Rather, the acknowledgment of 
questions which defy our hunger for swift resolution suggests a different 
approach to moral casuistry. Critical, careful moral reasoning is still essential, but 
the purpose of this casuistry is not so much to provide us with unimpeachable 
verdicts of rightness or wrongness so much as it is to test the limits of our 
construals of what is appropriate for us to do. Moral principles, valuable as they 
are, are but ethical shorthand. They capture in summary form a vast array of 
human experience that is mediated through the crucible of tested wisdom. 
No moral issue exists in a vacuum. The crisis of how we should care for the 
PVS patient merely brings in sharper relief the crisis of how we should care for 
any suffering person. Perhaps we need to re-focus the debate on ADNH. Suppose 
we ask not "whether and how ADNH should or should not be provided to PVS 
patients," but "what kinds of skills must we possess in order to be faithful and 
caring companions of sisters and brothers who are in the persistent vegetative 
state? By framing the issue in this fashion, I am suggesting that antecedent to the 
application of moral principles is the need to address the context of meaning in 
which we pose the question. Recourse to "quality of life," "benefit/burden," or 
other such principles to resolve this vexatious issue is but the beginning of the 
process. 
In other words, I am suggesting that inscribed in the formulation of these 
principles is a story or narrative of human life and its meaning that is often 
overlooked in the legitimate quest for clear guidelines for action. With respect to 
our brothers and sisters who are in the persistent vegetative state, have we dealt 
sufficiently with the story of their lives and their connection with us? Does not the 
fact that they are cognitively compromised confront us with our deepest fears of 
our own fragile purchase upon the control that accrues to the cognitively 
powerful? Because we find their wounded plight troubling, have we explored 
sufficiently the reasons why we are troubled by their "biological tenacity?" Have 
we probed sufficiently our own fears of mortality, and our own discomfort in 
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living with those who most acutely manifest our frail humanity? I raise these 
questions not as "trump" cards, but rather to suggest that attention to these larger 
"narrative" considerations may be a valuable contribution to the debate on care 
for patients in the persistent vegetative state. 
In conclusion, the purpose ofthis essay has been to review some ofthe issues in 
the vast debate on the care ofPVS patients and the provision of ADNH. I find the 
reasoning and cautions of the most recent NCCB statement to be persuasive, 
though as a signatory of the 1987 statement published in Issues in Law and 
Medicine, I stand by a more conservative policy of withdrawal of care for these 
individuals. I think the issue goes beyond the polemics of casuistry, whether of 
"proportionalist," "deontological," or "natural law" formulation. Questions of 
ultimacy are unavoidable even in a culture shaped by the twin forces of 
Enlightenment reason and technical prowess. These questions provoke us to 
explore the larger meanings by which we live. The crisis of the persistent 
vegetative state patient challenges us to consider this larger narrative, this larger 
story of life's ultimate meaning. I prefer to think that this tale implies our 
solidarity and care for these individuals, and that we should think carefully before 
we withdraw from them the companionship that the cognitively powerful owe to 
those who are less fortunate, but no less our sisters and brothers. 
Some issues that are worth further exploration occur to me as a result of this 
exercise, and I raise them to enrich our conversation with our distinguished 
respondents. First of all, it is interesting to contrast the differing emphases of the 
statements drafted by the bishops of Texas, Pennsylvania, Oregon and 
Washington. The Texas statement is perhaps the most permissive of the three I 
with respect to the PVS patient since it states that "these individuals are stricken I 
with a lethal pathology which, without artificial nutrition and hydration, will ~ 
lead to death."39 This statement can certainly be controverted on empirical 
grounds, but nonetheless it provides a warrant for a policy of withdrawal of 
ADNH. The Pennsylvania statement is the most restrictive of the three, and is 
similar in most respects to the 1987 statement drafted by William May, et. al. 40 
The Washington and Oregon Bishops take a more cautious mediating position 
that presumes the value of ADNH for PVS patients, but then suggest that public 
policy may require a less restrictive application of this presumption:41 
Because the wishes of the individual and the family are so important in this delicate area, 
it has proved difficult for legislators to formulate adequate legislation and for judges 10 
give decisions which take into account the complex moral dimensions involved. People 
who argue for more restrictive legislation are legitimately concerned about a "slippery 
slope" mentality, in which the legally sanctioned option to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment such as nutrition and hydration might encourage those in our society who are 
determined to promote euthanasia. At the same time, were our laws not to permit the 
morally justified withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from any permanently 
unconscious patients, many are convinced that public sympathy for the unnuanced 
position of the pro-euthanasia movement would be encouraged. 
My first question, then, is the following: does the permissibility of withdrawal 
of ADNH lead ineluctably to the euthanasia "slippery slope?" My second 
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question is concerned with the understanding of "burdensomeness." Can 
"burdensomeness" be expanded to include the interests of third parties (e.g.: 
family members, society) so that a decision to withdraw ADNH is not based on 
an unwarranted quality of life assessment of the PVS patient, but rather on the 
calculus of excessive "burden?" Thirdly, can there be a legitimate appeal to 
patient autonomy along the lines suggested by Germain Grisez, or does such an 
appeal ultimately erode the respect that is owed to the PVS patient? 
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